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A Thracian Charm and Socratic Teaching:
The Politics of Education
In 1993 the publisher Simon and Schuster
published fonner Secretary of Education William
1.Bennett's book entitled TheBook of Virtues. It
was an instant best seller and was followed last
Christmas by A Children's Book of Virtueswhich
now sits proudly on the best seller list as well. I
purchased the original book last December and it
was already in its 34th printing. Such success for
a book seems like a fantasy dream for those of us
with Ph.D. 's, matched perhaps only by Bloom's
Closing of the American Mind. Bennett
introduces the Book of Virtues by telling his
readers that he has compiled the following series
of poems, stories, myths, and excerpts on such
virtues as self-discipline, compassion, honesty,
courage and loyalty "to aid in the time honored
task of moral education of the young," and he
goes on to define moral education as "training of
heart and mind toward the good." He offers as an
aid in this training what he calls "moral literacy"
stories and examples.
With this book Bennett is tapping into a long
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tradition of educating the young by example, by
stories of heroics and of venality. We find this
model of education, for example, as a major
motivation for the writing of history among the
historians of Rome. Sallust, for instance. writing in
the first century Be, explains that he writes his
history because "the memory of what others have
accomplished kindles in the breasts of noble men
a flame that is not quenched until their own
prowess has won similar glory and renown." It
was with Machiavelli, though, that it became clear
that history was not always the guide for virtue
and heroism~ sometimes history told stories of the
bad who succeeded and the good who failed.
Bennett thus uses poems, stories, fables -- not
history -- as his texts for moral literacy.
Bennett recognizes well the legacy of this mode of
moral education through stories and myths when
he quotes a section from Plato's Republic as a
foreword to his entire collection. It is the section
where Socrates talks of the importance of
educating the warriors who are to populate the
just city he is founding in speech. The quote goes
like this: "The beginning is the most important
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part of any work, especially in the case of a young
and tender thing for that is the time at which
character is being formed." Bennett we should
note adds the modem word "character." Plato
does not use such a loaded term; he merely talks
about the young being "formed." Bennett
continues to quote, without comment, what many
today would find the more troubling part of this
education, though benign enough in its first
exposition -- namely, the warning: "Shall we just
carelessly allow children to hear any casual tales
which may be devised by casual persons, and to
receive into their minds ideas for the most part the
very opposite of those which we should wish them
to have when they are grown up?" "We cannot,"
replies his interlocutor -- and off Socrates and his
companions go to censor the poems of Homer and
Hesiod, deleting for instance all stories of gods
laughing uncontrollably and of heroes mourning
the deaths of their loved ones.
In Bennett, in Sallust, in the Socrates of the
Republic, the assumption is that stories told with
examples of virtue and vice will lead the listener--
especially the child -- to virtue. But will they?
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Are such stories a means to virtue -- or
conformity? In the more basic framing of the
question, as Socrates himself phrases it on a
number of occasions in the Platonic dialogues, can
virtue be taught at all? What does it mean to act
as ifvirtue can, in some almost mechanical way, be
transferred' from a story about heroism to acts of
heroism, or stories about loyalty tum one into
loyal citizens?
One of the several places that Socrates asks this
question about whether virtue can be taught is in
a dialogue named the Protagoras and it leads the
sophist Protagoras, after whom the dialogue is
named, to recount a myth in which he tries to
explain how we can know that virtue -- or at least
the virtues of citizens - can be taught. Protagoras
tells this story when he is confronted by Socrates
who is himself accompanied by a young man,
Hippocrates by name. Hippocrates is eager to
study with the famous teacher Protagoras who has
just arrived in Athens -- so eager, in fact, that he
had rushed into Socrates' bedroom well before
dawn to ask Socrates to introduce him to the great
teacher. It would disturb our sleep, but I suspect
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many of us might all wish for young friends who
show such enthusiasm for learning. Socrates
resists a bit, slows down the pace and demands
that Protagoras explain to him and Hippocrates
what Hippocrates will learn if the young man
becomes Protagoras' student. Protagoras
promises that he will make him a good/virtuous
citizen. Socrates admires this response because he
has always noted that "not only in public with
regard to the city, but also in private life, the
wisest and the best citizens are not able to hand
over the virtue they have to others." He looks at
the great Pericles' sons (who happen to be in the
room); they have not been educated by their
famous father in the virtues in which the father
himself excels; they instead, Socrates notes, "go
about grazing at will like sacred oxen coming
upon, or chancing upon virtue all by themselves --
automatoi" -- a curious image this, Pericles' sons
grazing as if sacred oxen. Do we simply chance
on virtue? Can the fathers, can the city, can the
Sophists teach the young to be virtuous?
Protagoras responds to Socrates' challenge about
whether virtue is teachable with a myth; it is really
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a creation myth in which all the animals have been
formed, but not given any particular excellences.
Epimetheus, the backward looking brother of
Prometheus, distributes assorted virtues or
excellences to the animals, swiftness, coats of hair,
claws and so forth, but he runs out of such
excellences by the time he reaches the human
being. Left on their own, humans begin to war
with one another as if in a Hobbesian state of
nature until Zeus, fearing lest they kill off one
another, sends them two qualities -- shame and a
sense of justice. These are the two qualities that
enable them to live with one another; shame
provides a restraint and justice gives the sense of
what is due and what ought to be. Once humans
share these virtues, they can live together in cities,
but they must all share in these fundamental virtues
if there is to be peace among them. This is unlike
excellence in the arts, where the city can survive if
only a few know shipbuilding and others know
shoemaking or military strategy. Not everyone
can be excellent in those skills, but justice and
shame belong to all and if some one does not have
them by nature (automatoi), they will be forced,
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Protagoras says, to have them. How? By
punishment. As Protagoras points out, if one is
ugly, we do not punish that person with floggings
to make him beautiful~ but if one does not have a
sense of shame or justice, he is punished.
Protagoras claims punishment will straighten out
the "twisted piece of wood," as he calls the unjust
and shameless child. This shows, according to
Protagoras, that virtue is teachable. The portrait
that Protagoras paints of human nature is a cruel
one~ for some virtue comes only from floggings,
again according to Protagoras as portrayed by
Plato, this demonstrates that virtue can be taught.
Now, as is obvious from this extended Preface to
my talk, I am turning away from contemporary
writers, from our modem political pundits and
social critics to a dead white European male and to
a problem he addressed two and a half millennia
ago, a problem, as Bennett's books and the
rhetoric of our times makes all too clear to us,
which continues to confront us as we live the lives
of public and private individuals. The dead white
European male to whom I tum in this and many
questions is, of course, Plato -- and the problem is
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that of whether we can educate the young to
virtue, whether such an education is possible,
whether we can plan, organize and provide for
such an education, whether the city and citizens
are educators, or whether we must leave the
young to graze like sacred oxen, like Pericles' sons
"by themselves" automatoi. And, since I come
from a political science background, I tum to the
political implications of the efforts to educate in
virtue. Ultimately, I believe Plato is profoundly
pessimistic on this point, suggesting that we are
indeed at the mercy of chance like the sons of
Pericles -- and to approach education in virtue
more systematically has tyrannical rather than
liberating consequences. This is not necessarily a
conclusion we - Bill Bennett or we -- would want
to hear, but Plato does, I believe, make us aware
of some of the dangers of education in "virtue"
and its tyrannical implications. I am, I admit,
making a fundamental assumption here that is not
accepted by everyone: namely, that a dead white
European male like Plato may indeed have
something important to say to us worthy of our
time, that he may force us to rethink our givens
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and reveal to us the limits - and tyrannies -- of our
own ambitions.
Plato certainly has not been much of a hero for the
modem age. Ever since Karl Popper accused him
of being one of the founders of the closed society
and therewith a forerunner of totalitarianism,
Plato's philosophy has lost much of its
attractiveness. An advocate of hierarchy, a critic
of democracy as the rule of the passions, a believer
in epistemological absolutism and, apart from a
brief lapse in Book V of the Republic where he
seems to suggest an equality for women in political
life, a denigrator of the female as fascinated by the
tawdry and multicolored and weak in the face of
hardships -- all these are reasons offered for a
critical dismissal of Plato as an educator for our
age.
I obviously take a very different view and want to
suggest how looking at Platonic dialogues can
help us address perennial questions that continue
to confront us about the meaning, nature, purpose,
limits of the education and to suggest that only
mis-readings of his dialogues lead to Plato the
totalitarian rather than Plato the defender against
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tyranny. Plato's dialogues do not give us clear
answers to the questions that he raises and which
we must confront, they provide no blueprints,
offer no precise curricula advice, but they do point
to assumptions that underlie the efforts at
education in virtue, and in particular, the issues
that we must consider when we begin to think
about the education of the young in virtue, and the
place that the polity can or cannot play in their
education. Bill Bennett's dream that reading the
right tales to the young will build a nation of
virtuous citizens seems hopelessly naive when
faced with the Socratic presentation of the
complexity of human nature and its potential for
aiming towards the good.
The title of my talk makes reference to a Thracian
charm. The allusion is to Plato's dialogue the
Charmides, a dialogue that is usually subtitled "on
moderation" or in the more dated translation of the
Greek word sophrosune, temperance This is the
dialogue around which I intend to build the rest of
my discussion. Since the Charmides is not one of
Plato's most frequently read dialogues, let me
spend a little time giving you a sense of the
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dialogue, its vitality, its arguments, and again, I
fear, some of its pessimism at least about the
possibility of teaching virtue.
At the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates has just
returned to Athens from battle at Potideia, one of
the early battles between Athens and Sparta during
the Peloponnesian War. The Spartans had been
victorious at Potideia and many Athenian lives
were lost. Socrates, now a survivor of that battle,
heads directly to the wrestling schools or gymnasia
where his friends spend their time and the young
men of Athens congregate. His acquaintance
Chaerephon rushes to greet him -- delighted that
he has returned safely from the costly battle. We
begin the dialogue with a reminder of the war
between democratic Athens and oligarchic Sparta
-- and the contrast between the two cities, I will
argue, serves as a backdrop to the discussion that
follows. Socrates, after telling the news from the
battlefield, turns away from talk of war and
politics to ask Chaerephon about the youths of the
city, if any of them had distinguished himself in
beauty or in wisdom or in both. A certain Critias
-- forgetting about the philosophy part of the
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question -- immediately tells Socrates of one who
surpasses all in beauty -- Channides, by name --
the son of Glaucon and the cousin and ward of
Critias. All the young men are in love with
Charmides, gazing at him, Socrates reports, "as if
he were a statue" and Critias suggestively asserts
that were they to strip Channides of his clothes,
the beauty of his form would overwhelm any
attention to his face. Socrates asks, though,
whether Channides has a soul that is good by
nature and proposes that they strip him -- not of
his cloak so that they may see his body, but so that
they can see his soul; Critias, basking in the
reflected glory of his cousin, responds that
Channides is also a philosopher and a poet --not
bad for someone probably around thirteen years
old.
The challenge that Socrates poses here of seeing
the soul captures the tension that characterizes all
of Plato ' s work, the tension between the seen and
the unseen -- the body and the qualities of the
individual that we cannot observe through the
senses. From the Homeric poems on we hear
about the beauty of the human body, about the
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beauty of the Homeric heroes Achilles, Hector,
Diomedes in action and about the meanness of
those who are ugly like Thersites, a hunchback
worthy of the whipping he receives from
Odysseus. The great accomplishment of Socratic
and Platonic philosophy was to transform virtue or
human excellence from the external qualities of the
body and heroic actions to the internal, invisible
beauty of the soul. To do this, though, creates new
problems: how do we observe the beauty of the
soul? and if Socrates is correct to associate virtue
with internal qualities of the individual, how can
we know whether anyone is virtuous; or to put it
another way, how do we know whether education
has transformed the wicked into the good, made
the child virtuous where before he or she was not,
-- whether we have made straight, in Protagoras'
words, the "twisted piece of wood. "
In such dialogues as the Gorgias and the Republic,
Socrates faces the challenge of arguing that it is
better to be just than to seem or appear to be just.
For example, Adeimantus challenges Socrates in
the Republic: "For the things said [i.e., the
comments of the poets, the stories he has been
13
told] indicate that there is no advantage in my
being just, if I don't also seem to be, while the
labors and penalties involved are evident. But ifl
am unjust, but have provided myself with a
reputation for justice, a divine life is promised." In
the Gorgias a young man remarks with disbelief
that Socrates could think that it would be better to
be punished if one is found unjustly seeking
tyranny, than to live as happily ever after as a
tyrant with a reputation for justice. In each of the
these dialogues, the Gorgias and the Republic
Socrates must ultimately resort to myth to deal
with that which is beyond sight. When Socrates
says that he wants to see the soul of Charmides, he
wants to go beyond the beautiful and alluring body
that puts even Socrates, he admits, into a
condition of erotic excitement. Socrates wants,
however, to gain knowledge of what cannot be
seen. The dialogue, the use of words will help us
to do this, but where Plato still leaves us uncertain
is whether, once we have transcended the limits of
sight through words to see the soul, whether we
can influence and change that invisible soul with
words?
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I have been using the tenn "soul" as the translation
of the Greek psyche without apology, though for
sure the tenn sits uneasily in modem academic
discourse. From Hobbes's materialism in the
seventeenth century to the twentieth century's
positivistic insistence on the observability of all
phenomena to contemporary psychology's
reduction of the individual to a set of responses,
the soul largely remains in exile in modem political
discourse and yet when we talk about education in
virtue, its possibilities, its limits, its goals, we are
sufficient heirs of Socrates to want to address the
qualities of an individual that go beyond what we
see, beyond responses, beyond the beauty of the
body. Whether we want to use the heavily laden,
theologized word that is traditionally used to
translate the word psyche may be questionable, but
for simplicity's sake I accept the standard
translation ofpsyche with the request that we strip
it of the baggage it has acquired over the years.
Back to the Charm ides: When Critias sends his
slave to bring Charmides to meet Socrates, he tells
the slave to tell Charmides that he has a doctor for
him to see about a weakness he had spoken of --
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in particular, a weakness in his head when he gets
up in the morning. In a dialogue that will focus on
the virtue of moderation, we may ask ourselves
whether this morning weakness in the head is the
sign of a certain immoderation with regard to wine
from the evening before. Critias asks Socrates to
pretend that he has such a medicine -- a
pharmakon -- for Charmides's head and when
Charmides himself asks whether Socrates has
some cure, Socrates says that he "somehow
managed to answer" that he did. This cure, this
pharmakon, we must remember is a pretense, an
illusion, that enables Socrates to speak with
Charmides. Socrates claims to have knowledge
that he tells the person to whom he is relating the
story and to us the readers as well that he does not
in fact have so that Charmides will speak with him.
Socrates thus tells Charmides that he might just
happen to have a certain leaf that can cure
headaches, but the leaf only works when it is
applied along with the singing of a certain charm.
Socrates elaborates on the powers of this
supposed charm: The charm along with the leaf
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makes one completely well, but the leaf without
the chann is useless and the charm cannot heal the
head alone; it must attend to the whole person,
just as a good doctor does not heal a part of the
body but must heal the whole. Socrates learned
about this chann from a Thracian doctor of whom
it was claimed that he could make you immortal.
This doctor said that one should not attempt to
cure the eyes without the head or the head without
the body -- or the body without the soul. "At
present," the Thracian continued in his supposed
speech to Socrates, "this is the great mistake of
men that they try to cure without using both -- the
medicine for the particular part and the charm for
the whole." The whole here means the soul -- and
to treat the soul we need to use the Thracian
charm -- namely words, for they will, as Socrates
says, engender "moderation. " The doctor
specifically enjoined Socrates not to let anyone,
however wealthy or well born or handsome, i.e., a
Charmides, convince him to try to heal a part
rather than the whole. So following this supposed
-- remember Socrates is making this story up --
this supposed injunction from the Thracian doctor,
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Socrates indicates that he can only provide a
phannakon for the weakness of the head if he can
heal the soul first.
Critias is delighted that because of the efforts to
cure Charmides' weakness in the head, Charmides
will gain a better "understanding" when he submits
himself to the charm of Socrates' words; but
Critias, as we have seen before, is proud of his
cousin and ward who stirs up so much erotic
longing among others in Athens, and he comments
that Charmides is not only beautiful in form, but
also has what this supposed Thracian charm is
supposed to produce: moderation; given the
headaches in the morning, we may want to
question Critias' knowledge of the soul of his
ward.
Socrates begins by bluntly asking Charmides
whether he is sufficiently moderate, whether we
need to apply the chann to induce moderation first
or whether we can get right to the application of
the leaf How would we react if someone were to
pose that question to us? We'd hem and haw and
apologize, I suspect. Charmides blushes; he
recognizes, he says, that if he claims not to be
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moderate he will be contradicting his guardian
Critias who has just praised his moderation and
thus appear to accuse his guardian of lying. If he
claims moderation for himself, he will seem
immodest, praising himself which is not
particularly pleasing to others.
We learn a great deal about Charmides from this
blush; this is a young man who knows what is
expected of him -- what is the appropriate
behavior in the society in which he lives. But note
how he expresses himself He cares about what
others think of him. How will he be perceived?
Either affirmation or denial of his own moderation
means for him offending some. We are reminded
here of Prot agoras' speech. Charmides has the gift
that Zeus sent, shame; shame induced blushing,
but is shame enough? Isn't it just a mechanism for
conformity? Doesn't Charmides still have the
headache that comes in the mornings? Charmides'
blush reveals not only his own sense of shame, but
the confusion, or what is called in Socratic terms
aporia, the being without a way or a road, that
goes along with a dependence on the opinions of
others. The blush is an admission of the
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inadequacy of Protagoras' shame as a guide to
virtue.
Socrates offers the blushing Channides an
alternative, one that might help him escape the
awkwardness of needing to please all his
observers. Socrates suggests that if Channides has
moderation within him, as Critias claimed he did,
he will be able to express in words what it is:
"Since you know the Greek language," Socrates
says, "put into words what ever it appears to be to
you." Thus begins the central part of the dialogue
as Channides struggles to express what he
supposedly has within him -- and thus begins the
effort to see whether Channides needs the
counterfeit doctor Socrates to apply his phony
Thracian charm or whether Channides already is
moderate and thus needs only the leaf
Socrates begins by asking: "In order that we may
know whether it is in you or not, say what
moderation is according to your opinion." At first
Charmides hesitates, but then finally suggests, not
entirely unreasonably that moderation is a sort of
orderliness (kosmios) and quietness; yes, that is it,
he says, a quietness; in Greek hesuchia. This
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word happens to have particular connotations and
happens to connect our beautiful young Athenian
to Sparta, the city with which Athens is at war.
The Athenian Thucydides wrote a history of that
war and includes in his history a wonderful speech
by the Corinthians. In that speech, he has the
Corinthians present what we today might call the
national character of Athens and Sparta. In
contrast to the active involved Athenians, the
Spartans are a people dominated by hesuchia,
quietness, resistance to change: "You alone of the
Hellenes," the Corinthians say, "are quiet." (1.69).
The Athenians, in contrast, are portrayed as a
people "of whom one might truly say that they
were born into the world to take no rest
themselves and to give none to others. "
Charmides, the Athenian youth, associates
moderation with the quality of the enemies of
Athens. When we get to the end of the dialogue,
we shall understand better Charmides' natural
inclination for the Spartans and his immediate
association of virtue, his proclaimed virtue of
moderation, with the national character of Sparta.
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Socrates easily, perhaps too easily, dismisses this
equation of moderation with quietness or hesuchia
by turning quietness into slowness; once this is
done it becomes child's play to point to activities
that benefit from swiftness rather than slowness.
Socrates mentions writing, reading, playing the
lyre, learning, and so forth as he gently leads
Charmides to reject this Spartan trait as the basis
of moderation. After the next brief effort by
Charmides to suggest 'a la Protagoras that
moderation is a sense of shame -- the social
restraints that we saw him wilting under when he
blushed - Charmides stops giving us his own ideas
and turns to something he thinks he remembers
having once heard from someone close. He now
takes his thoughts from elsewhere, no longer
trying to find moderation within himself Does this
tell us whether he needs the Thracian charm, that
he is not moderate, despite Critias' claims that he
does not? If we are virtuous, does that mean that
we can articulate what virtue is? Charmides now
asks what Socrates thinks of a definition he has
heard from someone else, namely that moderation
is "doing one's own thing."
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For those of you who have read Plato's Republic
recently or even not so recently you may
remember the phrase "doing one's own thing," In
the Republic the phrase "doing one's own thing"
is the definition of justice, not moderation. There
"doing one's own thing" does not have the
contemporary liberal connotations of you leaving
me alone to do what I want and rlileave you alone
to do what you want; rather, in the very process
of doing one's thing -- that for which one is suited
-- one helps the whole community, one exercises
one's skills for the welfare of the entire
community. This is where justice enters -- it is the
welfare of the whole, not the individual. In any
case, Charmides has recalled this phrase, spoken
by someone close, "doing one's own thing," but he
has gotten the story all wrong; our beautiful
young man is not very astute. Socrates
immediately suspects that it is Critias who tried to
teach Charmides the lessons of the Republic;
Critias denies it --perhaps, not wanting to be
caught in the role of being a bad teacher. Socrates
quiets Critias by saying that it does not matter who
said it; the question is, Socrates claims, whether
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what was spoken was spoken truthfully or not.
This seems a simple statement meant to defuse a
tense situation and one we would expect from a
Socrates who has been lionized as the seeker after
Truth with a capitalIT", but if we take seriously
the effort to think about moderation as doing one's
own thing, not intruding into the lives (or words)
of others the question must arise as to whether
speech or words do or do not belong to a person.
Discourse today, especially in feminist circles,
often centers around the loss of voice and the loss
of authenticity when one does not speak one's own
words, but the words of another -- when women
speak the language of men rather than their own
language. Socrates, not as worried as modem
writers about the relationship between oppression
and the speech of others has a somewhat different
take on the issue. Rather than worrying about the
oppression implied in speaking the speech of
others, reading the words of others, he asks more
moderately whether when we speak the words of
another -- or read the books of another -- we are
not meddling in their affairs rather than tending to
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our own, whether we are transgressing some
boundaries of "ownership" and thus being both
immoderate and unjust. If moderation (or justice)
is indeed doing our own thing can we speak,
repeat or read the words of others without being
immoderate or unjust? Whereas modem feminist
writers see this as oppression, Socrates sees it as
meddlesomeness.
Now, even though the question of whose speech
we speak has permeated some contemporary
writers' work, the questions that Socrates poses
about whether it is our own speech or words or
the speech of others that we speak or write do I
admit seem somewhat weird or absurd. Listen to
one of the passages on this topic from the
Charmides:
And does the scribe, in your opinion, write and
read his name only, and teach you the same with
yours? Or did you write your enemies' names just
as much as your own and your friends'?
Just as much, responds Charmides
Were you meddlesome or immoderate in doing
this?
Not at all
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And you know you were not doing your own
thing, if writing and reading are doing something.
This is often where frustration with the Platonic
dialogue sets in and the book and Socrates along
with it get tossed. But let's persevere.
In the Republic, adhering to the notion of
justice as doing one's own thing leads to the
elimination of theater, both tragedy and comedy,
since actors are speaking the words of another, not
their own. In the model that Socrates is
developing the words we speak are ours -- the
words of others which we repeat show our
meddlesomeness -- our distance from the quiet of
moderation where we do our own thing. Are we
beginning to get a hint here that perhaps
moderation defined as doing one's own thing may
be no virtue at all and that being quiet, like the
Spartans tending to their own affairs, is indeed
showing a certain slowness and becomes the
barrier to learning rather than its basis, that the
common ways of thinking about moderation that
have surfaced in this dialogue prevent rather than
enhance the learning of virtues?
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Can we function NOT using the language of
others? To so restrain ourselves means to lose the
capacity for communication -- whether it be
meddling in the speech of others or speaking the
language of the oppressor. To deny ourselves
such speech is to remove ourselves from human
interaction. Let me elaborate a bit. As Socrates
goes on, by learning to write the names of others,
by speaking the speech of others, we become in
Socrates'language "busy bodies" - in Greek this a
polypragmosune - polu -- many,pragme affairs --
ones who get involved in the affairs of others --
indeed, very much like the Athenians who, as the
Corinthians of Thucydides' history noted, were
born to give no rest to others, and like the
Athenian citizens who in their democratic
assemblies, in their collective decision making,
become involved in the affairs of others. To write
and speak that which is not one's own makes one
an interferer - in quoting Plato and Socrates here,
I am, according to Socrates, meddling in what is
not my own. Plato writing down the words of
Socrates is a contradiction of the same principles.
But is this not the very activity of education and --
27
I should add as well -- of democratic political life
in ancient Athens? Does it not say something
about the concept of what is one's own and the
necessary openness to others that is central to this
process of education and democracy? Is there
some connection with Socratic education and
democracy in the meddlesomeness in the affairs of
others? If to be moderate is to restrain ourselves
from such involvement, is not immoderation
necessary for education and for democracy? In this
little interchange, Socrates is pointing to the
ambiguity and uncertainty about the language of
moderation and justice and virtue in general and
suggesting I believe how precise definitions can
become constraining and limiting.
Charmides tries to resist the curious implications
of Socrates' questioning; they seem as weird to
him as they do to us upon first hearing or reading.
But Socrates continues to push him and further on
in the dialogue not only is reading and writing
meddling in what is not one's own, but also
medicine, and building and weaving, and
producing anything that comes into being through
some skill for another. Socrates asks Charmides
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whether a city seems to him well organized where
each person weaves his own cloak or makes his
own shoes. Clearly not; the one skilled in
weaving should weave for others and the one
skilled in cooking should cook for others. We do
not attend to our own things only; insofar as we
live among others and engage in activities with
others we are -- like the Athenians in their national
character -- busy bodies -- intervening in the lives
of others. We do not do our own thing -- and if
this is the definition of justice or of moderation
then we are neither moderate or just -- and ought
not to be. Even to read the Platonic dialogue is to
appropriate for ourselves the speech of another.
For there to be political life, for us to live as
human beings together -- we must go beyond
doing our own thing and do the things of others.
Only the isolated individual living in a cave
without human contact can fulfill the moderation
or justice demanded by the definition that
Charmides here and Socrates in the Republic has
proposed.
The Greek word that I have been translating as
busy body or meddler, as I mentioned before, is
polypragmosune; it is a peculiar word. The
Corinthians in their speech in Thucydides' history
described the Athenians as "least inactive," as ones
who do indeed meddle in the affairs of others.
Socrates in the Apology, his defense before the
Athenians, also describes himself as a busy-body,
one who meddles in the affairs of others. By so
describing himself, Socrates portrays himself as
similar to the democratic Athenian citizens who
participate in making decisions that control the
lives of their fellow citizens and indeed like the city
of Athens itself that has become the leader of an
empire. Today, too often, we think of democracy
as rights, rights of protection from others and
rights to services and rights to participate in the
legislative process that will pass laws that will
affect our private interests. Socrates as a busy
body in Athens and in his process of education,
and as an Athenian citizen, reminds us that
democracy more fundamentally entails
involvement in the lives of others, entails being a
busy body, intervening in the lives of others -- not
only speaking their speech, but also making laws
and regulations that define what they can and
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cannot do.
Socrates' virtue and the virtue of the Athenian
citizen do not rest on doing their own things, on
their not meddling in the affairs of others -- they
are never being moderate with regard to such
meddlesomeness. Socrates is emphatically a
meddler and like the Athenians gives no rest to
himself nor to others. To be a meddler, as is
Socrates and as are the Athenians, is to disrupt the
conventional and traditional -- and in particular to
introduce complexity -- not let us do just our own
things -- and not to blush. While Socrates is like
the democratic Athens, Charmides, the beautiful
youth who inspires the erotic gazes of those
around him is more like the Spartans; he stands as
an object of admiration adored by the young and
old who watch and follow him in the gymnasium.
He is an object, not an actor. He does not
transform others as does Socrates and as do the
Athenians to the world around them.
I fear I would try everyone's patience if I were to
follow through for you the rest of the argument in
Charmides (which at times becomes even more
arcane than the section about writing your own
and your enemies' names). But let me just note
that Critias, that inadequate teacher of.Charmides,
dominates the second half of the dialogue and
Socrates, as with he did with Charmides, leads him
to question what benefit is moderation, even at
one point wondering if moderation is anything at
all. "For our suggestion just now that moderation
as a guide to ordering house or state must be a
great boon was not to my thinking, Critias, a
proper agreement." (172d) At the same time, he
keeps remarking how curious it is that they may be
concluding that moderation does not accomplish
anything positive for us.
Why this uncertainty about whether moderation is
good? The definitions that have surfaced,
quietness, shame, doing one's own thing, and in
the Critias section knowing what one knows all
support the Spartan values or Spartan national
character, the character of the enemies of
democratic Athens. The Athenians are the
opposite -- they are not quiet, they are defiant,
meddlers, and always seeking new adventures. A
quick history lesson is in now order here: The
Spartans ultimately win the Peloponnesian War
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and as a result of their victory a group, the so-
called Thirty Tyrants, become rulers in Athens.
Among the Thirty, as they come to be called, are
the two men with whom we have just spent the
evening: Critias and Charmides. After all this
discussion of moderation, after all the attempts to
define it, after all Socrates' efforts to apply a
Thracian charm to heal the whole person,
Charmides and Critias become tyrannical rulers in
Athens.
The dialogue concludes with Charmides and
Critias agreeing that Charmides shall submit
himself to the charms of Socrates. They decide
this without including Socrates in the discussion.
When Socrates inquires about this arrangement,
Charmides says, "You will be forced since Critias
commands it. So take counsel as to what you shall
do." Socrates replies: "There is no room for
counsel since no one would be able to oppose you
if you use force. " Thus ends this dialogue about
moderation. Of course, in the context of this
dialogue the discussion of force is presented in a
playful and ironic fashion, but the dark undertones
are there. Though the Thirty Tyrants rule briefly,
they rule harshly and while they do they cause
much suffering to the Athenians as they.prosecute,
execute and expropriate. The playful ending and
tone of the entire dialogue are prelude to the harsh
political consequences of the concern with
moderation as it comes out in the Channides' and
Critias' vision. The tyranny they impose politically
has its parallels in the tyranny of their attempt to
heal themselves through the forced application of
the charm. They search for a static point.
Socrates in contrast is in motion, engagement and
most significantly, incompletion.
Whom does the dialogue educate then? Certainly
not Charmides nor Critias. Neither is made
virtuous by the words and charms of this dialogue.
If anything, they become more obdurate,
determined to "force" Socrates to apply his
Thracian charm. They are driven by their own
desire for power and the concern for how they
appear before the evaluative gazes of others. The
readers of the dialogue, however, who in the
process of reading it, meddle in the lives of others
and appropriate Plato's and Socrates' speech, are
the obvious beneficiaries; they (we) are
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intemperate or unjust as we engage in the affairs of
others. Our education comes from this
immoderation; we do not learn specific answers to
questions posed; we do not learn how to heal the
whole person; we may be no more successful at
finding the sources of virtue than are Pericles' sons
grazing like sacred oxen, but we recognize how
Charmides' and Critias, demanding cures, insisting
that Socrates continue his charm, fail to recognize
the complexity of the pursuit of understanding.
WilliamBennett begins his volume on Virtues with
the virtue of self-discipline. I would suggest that
self-discipline is in many ways the modem
analogue of moderation. To instill this self-
discipline Bennett urges us to recite assorted
rhymes and poems to the young. He begins with
one from Robert Louis Stevenson which includes
a stanza that goes like this:
But the unkind and the unruly
And the sort who eat unduly
They must never hope for glory---
Theirs is quite a different story!
And in another anonymous ditty "John, Tom, and
James," with the note from Bennett "We meet
three ill-behaved children (who nobody likes)," we
hear of:
John was a bad boy, and beat a poor cat;
Tom put a stone in a blind man's hat;
James was the boy who neglected his prayers;
They've all grown up ugly, and nobody cares.
Socrates had begun the dialogue with the Thracian
charm, but by the end he expresses distress about
"the charm I learned from the Thracian that I
should have spent so much pains on a lesson which
has had such a wortWess effect." And he wonders
whether Charmides even needs the charm but the
future tyrants still long for it. "I quite believe,"
says Charmides, "that I do need the charm" and
that is why he and Critias plot to "force Socrates"
to continue the charm. The Thracian charm, I
would like to suggest, is like the stories and poems
Bill Bennett tells, stories that make the virtues
seem simple, charms that magically transform the
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individual to confonnity with others' expectations,
that lull us into a quietness of self-satisfaction.
Plato/Socrates teaches human excellence which is
complex, uncertain, searching and unsure, engaged
and even intrusive. It is emphatically not pursuing
the formulaic definitions of virtue which constrain
and threaten, which set up the judgment of others,
the mechanisms- of shame as the tool to create
youths of virtue. Plato/Socrates are not, I can add
now, the forerunners of twentieth century
totalitarianism. Rather, in the denial of precise
definitions, in the rejection of simplistic charms,
they warn about the dangers of a love of simplicity
in our concern for the education of the young.
There is no Thracian charm that can heal and make
us whole and the search for it can only lead to the
tyranny of the Thirty.
Allow me a moment of self-reflection to end my
talk: Am I any different from Bill Bennett who
tells stories to instill virtue. I've told stories:
Protagoras' myth, the story of Socrates' return
from battle, the encounter between Socrates and
Charmides, the story of the Thracian charm, but I
have learned from these stories a skepticism about
whether they can teach virtue, a quality that
remains vague and ill-defined. The stories do
teach a critical thinking -- an openness to the
complexity of problems, a suspicion about whether
future tyrants can force Socrates to teach
moderation to a young man who has demonstrated
immoderation in drinking, a worry about easy
answers and thus a protection against tyranny.
Bill Bennett wants his stories to teach simple
lessons. Except for the most simplistic of them,
like the poem about "John, Tom and James,"
good literature is complex. Among the pieces
included in Bennett's section on self-discipline are
some lines from Macbeth about the self-discipline
needed by Macbeth and urged on him by Lady
Macbeth to murder Duncan the king of Scotland,
but Bennett notes "it's the wrong kind of self-
discipline, driven only by runaway ambitions." So
how do we know, Socrates would ask, which self-
discipline we want. We need to go beyond the
praise of virtues. Good literature points to the
complexity of virtues, not their simplicity. It
opens up possibilities and varieties. Perhaps in
response to Socrates' persistent question about
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whether we can teach virtue, the answer must be
that we cannot, but we can provide the settings in
which easy answers of a tyrannical simplicity are
replaced with the complexity that moves us to a
more thoughtful assessment of educational goals
and political limits. Through our very reading of
Platonic dialogues, we become meddlers in the
lives other others; the dialogues, like democratic
regimes, provide such a setting. I fear Bill
Bennett's stories and fables, assuming models of
virtues, do not.
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